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Abstract
We analyze the Shapley value allocation of an economy with differ-
ential information. Since the intent of the Shapley value is to measure
the sum of the expected marginal contributions made by an agent
to any coalition that he/she belongs to, the value allocation of an
economy with differential information provides an interesting way to
measure the information advantage of an agent. This feature of the
Shapley value allocation is not necessarily shared by the Walrasian
equilibrium and the core. Thus, we analyze the informational struc-
ture of an economy with asymmetric information from a different and
new viewpoint.
In particular we address the following questions: How do coalitions
of agents share their private information? How can one measure the
information advantage or superiority of an agent? Is each agent's
private information verifiable by other members of a coalition? Do
coalitions of agents pool their private information? Do agents have
an incentive to report their true private information? What is the
correct concept of a value allocation in an economy with asymmetric
information? Do value allocations exist in an economy with private
information? We provide answers to each of these questions.
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1 Introduction
The concept of a (cardinal) value allocation was first introduced by Shapley
(1969). Roughly speaking it is defined as a feasible allocation which yields
to each agent in the economy a "utility level" which is equal to the sum of
the agent's expected marginal contributions to all coalitions that he/she is
a member of. Because the Shapley value measures the sum of the expected
marginal contributions of an agent made to any coalition that he/she belongs
to, we argue in this paper that it provides an interesting way to measure the
"worth" of an agent's information advantage in an economy with differential
information. This feature of the Shapley value allocation is not necessarily
shared by the Walrasian equilibrium and the core. Thus, we analyze the
informational structure of an economy with differential information from a
different and new viewpoint. In particular, we address the following ques-
tions: How can one measure the information advantage or superiority of an
agent? How do coalitions of agents share their private information? Is each
agent's private information verifiable by all other members of a coalition?
Do agents have an incentive to report their private information truthfully?
What is the correct concept of a value allocation with private information?
Do value allocations exist in an economy with private information? We pro-
vide answers to each of these questions.
We consider a two-period economy where each agent i is characterized by
a utility function, a random second period endowment, a prior belief about
the distribution of all agent's second period endowments, and private infor-
mation about the actual endowment realizations after uncertainty is revealed
in the second period. Let T{ denote the private information set of agent i
(which is a partition of a probability space) and S denote a coalition of
agents. We first show that the notions of a value allocation for an economy
with differential information which correspond to Wilson's (1978) concepts
of the coarse and the fine core, respectively, are problematic. Indeed, we
show that the coarse value allocation, where the net-trade of each agent is
A,6S^r:'"measurahle 1 (and hence information is verifiable by each member
^he symbol Aigs ?\ denotes the "meet" which is the maximal partition which is con-
tained in all partitions T{. Intuitively, this is the maximum amount of information which
all agents share. By a slight abuse of notation, we will denote the cr-algebra generated by
a partition Ti also by JF,. If Q is a countable set then clearly every sub-cr-algebra of T is
generated by a partition {T denotes the cr-algebra of measurable subsets of Q).
of the coalition), and the fine value allocation, where the net-trade of each
agent is Vte s ^-measurable
2 (and hence coalitions of agents pool their in-
formation), do not reflect in any interesting way the information advantage
or superiority of an agent. This is rather surprising: Since the value allo-
cation is a cooperative solution concept, intuition suggests that the rational
behavior by members of a coalition is either to pool their private informa-
tion (fine value allocation) or to base their decision on public information
(common knowledge) of all members of a coalition (coarse value allocation).
However, we not only show that a coarse value allocation does not exist
generically (unless the information asymmetry is trivial)—we show that if
a coarse value allocation exists for some private information economy, then
the emergence of a player with trivial (i.e., bad or no) information destroys
existence immediately. In the case of the fine value allocation, we show that
the private information of a particular agent is completely irrelevant, i.e., the
value allocation corresponds to the complete information case. Furthermore,
whenever agents in a coalition are required to pool their private information
(as the fine value allocation demands) they may not have an incentive to
report their information truthfully.
Fortunately, the problems noted above do not arise if we assume that
the net-trade of each agent is J^-measurable because the information advan-
tage of each agent is taken into account in this setting. This T
x
-measurable
value allocation concept corresponds to the core notion introduced by Yan-
nelis (1991) and subsequently examined by Allen (1991). 3 We show that
this concept has nice incentive properties: it fulfills a coalitional incentive
compatibility property that we introduce in this paper. Roughly speaking,
the coalitional incentive compatibility property captures the idea that within
a coalition it is impossible for a subcoalition to cheat the remaining agents
in the coalition by misreporting their private information, and thus making
themselves better off (i.e., there is truthful revelation of information in each
coalition). We call such a value allocation "coalitionally incentive compati-
ble,'' and give several examples which show its nice properties. In particular,
we show that the coalitional incentive compatible value allocation provides
more plausible outcomes than the core or the Walrasian equilibrium of a
V, e s -^ denotes the "join" of the T{. That is the minimal partition containing all T{.
Note that since the net-trade of each agent is ^".-measurable it is always the case that
\S — 1| members (where |.4| denotes the cardinality of the set A) of coalition 5 can pool
their private information to verify the private information of the remaining agent.
differential information economy. This suggests to us that the coalitional
incentive compatible value may (at least in certain cases) serve as a good
substitute for the more traditional equilibrium concepts in economies with
differential information. Finally, under standard assumptions (i.e., continuity
and concavity of the utility functions) we prove the existence of coalitional
incentive compatible value allocations. In the presence of finitely many states
of nature the existence of such value allocations follows readily from Shap-
ley's (1969) result. However, with a continuum of states, functional analytic
and measure theoretic arguments seem to be required. For the technical
reader we collect the basic mathematical results required, and provide a rig-
orous proof in Section 8. Non-technical readers can skip this section. Indeed
they only need to know that coalitional incentive compatible value allocations
exist in an economy with differential information under standard (continuity
and concavity) assumptions on the utility functions even in the case of a
continuum of states.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 contains notation.
In section 3 we outline the model (i.e., the exchange economy with differ-
ential information). In section 4 we define rigorously the concepts of the
coarse and the fine value allocations. Their interpretation is discussed in
section 5. In section 6 we introduce the notion of a coalitional incentive
compatible value allocation and show that it results in truthful revelation of
information within each coalition. The interpretation of this value allocation
is discussed in section 7—we argue that the coalitional incentive compatible
value allocation sheds some light on the debate on value allocations started
by the examples of Roth (1980) and Shafer (1980). A rigorous proof that
coalitional incentive compatible value allocations exist is given in section 8.
Section 9 contains some concluding thoughts and finally in the Appendix we
extend the examples discussed in sections 5 and 7 to a more general class of
economies.
2 Notation
Mn denotes the n-dimensional Euclidean space.
iRJ denotes the positive cone of IRn .
IR++ denotes the strictly positive cone of JRn .
2A denotes the set of all subsets of the set A.
denotes the empty set.
\ denotes set-theoretic subtraction.
\A\ denotes the cardinality of the set A.
Let (H,^", fj.) denote a measure space. Then T{ will always denote a mea-
surable partition4 of Q and E{(u>) will denote the element of the partition T{
which contains to. If X is a linear topological space, its dual is the space X*
of all continuous linear functional on X.
3 The Exchange Economy with Differential
Information
Let Y denote the commodity space. For simplicity we will identify Y with
1R 1+ , however, for our main existence result in section 8, Y may be infinite-
dimensional. Hence infinitely many commodities are permissible. We will
consider an exchange economy which extends over two time periods t = 0,
1
where consumption takes place in t = 1. At t = there is uncertainty
over the state of nature described by a probability space (Cl,Jr
,
/j.). Let
/ = {1, . .
.
, n] denote the set of all agents. In t = agents will agree on
net-trades which may be contingent on the state of nature in t = 1. However,
they have differential information with respect to the true state of nature.
This is modeled as follows: At t = 1 agents do not necessarily know which
state lj 6 Q has actually occurred, i.e., they know their own endowment
realization and every agent i might have some additional information about
the state described by a measurable partition T
x
of Q. 6 Since agents can
always observe their own endowment realization we can assume without loss
of generality that agent i's endowment is measurable with respect to J- x .
In summary, an exchange economy with differential information is given
by £ = {(A',, u,-, e,-, JF,, y)\ i = 1, . .
.
, n} where
(1) Xi\ Q — 2 is the consumption set of agent i\
4A measurable partition of Q is a collection of sets A{ G f , ! E W such that USi ^« = ^
and A( n A, = for all i j£ ;'.
5Y can be any separable Banach lattice with an order continuous norm, whose dual Y*
has the Radon-Nikodym Property (see section 8 for the appropriate definitions).
6Hence if Q is the true state of the economy in t = 1 then agent i observes the event
Etiu) in the partition T{ which contains Q.
(2) u,-: Y —> M is the utility function of agent i; 7
(3) Ti is a partition of Q, denoting the private information of agent i\
(4) e,: H —» K is the initial endowment of agent z, where each e,- is .7-",-
measurable and e,(u;) £ ^.(u;) /z-a.e.;
(5) // is a probability measure on Q denoting the common prior of each agent.
TTie expected utility of agent i of a is given by
/,
Ui(xi(uj)) dfi(u).
4 The Coarse and the Fine Value Allocation
In this section we introduce two different notions of the value allocation
for our asymmetric information economy. The difference stems from the
(measurability) restriction on the type of allocations that are allowed. Both
notions are analogs of the coarse and the fine cores of Wilson (1978). We
begin by defining these concepts. In section 5 we show that each is problem-
atic, and in section 6 we define a third concept which has better features.
The strategy in this section is to derive a game with transferable utility from
the economy with differential information, £, in which each agent's utility is
weighted by a factor A, which allows interpersonal utility comparisons. In
the value allocation itself no side-payments are necessary. At this point we
appeal to the principle of irrelevant alternatives: "If restriction of the feasible
'One may also assume that the utility function is random, i.e., U{ is a real valued
function defined on Q x Y . All the results of the paper will remain valid.
8 Bayesian updating of priors can be introduced as follows: Let qi.Q —* iR++ be a
Radon-Nikodym derivative (density function) denoting the prior of agent i. For each
i = 1, . .
.
, n, denote by Ei(ui) the event in Ti containing the realized state of nature w£fi
and suppose that f E , * qi(t) dfi(t) > 0. Given Ex (u) € Ti define the conditional expected
utility of agent i as follows:
/ Ui(t t Xi(t))qi(t\Ei(u))di4t) t
where
(0 iU$Ei{u)
qi(t\Ei(u,)) = I lM if t
€
£-
(
W ).
All the results of the paper remain valid if we use the above conditional expected utility
formulation. However, for the simplicity of the exposition we do not do so.
set, by eliminating side-payments, does not eliminate some solution point,
then that point remains a solution" [Shapley (1969)]. 9 We thus get a game
with side-payments as follows:
Definition 1. A game with side-payments T = (/, V) consists of a finite set
of agents I = {1, . . . ,n} and a superadditive, real valued function V defined
on I1 such that V(0) = 0. Each S C I is called a coalition and V(S) is the
"worth" of the coalition S.
The Shapley value of the game T, [Shapley (1953)] is a rule which assigns
to each agent i a "payoff" Sh,- given by the formula10
Sh,(K)= £ (|5| - 1)!
iJf
M5|V(S)-V(5\ {,})].
sci "I'
SD{i)
The Shapley value has the property that H,-6 / Sh,-(V) = V(7), i.e., the
Shapley value is efficient. For each economy with differential information
S and each set of weights {\ t :i = 1 n}. we associate a game with side-
payments (/, VAC ), [we also refer to this as a "transferable utility" (TU) game]
according to the rule:
For every coalition S C / let
VA
C (S) = max^A t /t*(*,-(w))<fo(w) (4.1)
subject to
(i) 5^x,H = £e t (u;),/x-a.e.
ies ies
(ii) x
x
— e, is /\ieS ^".-measurable for every i G S.
We are now ready to give a formal definition of the coarse value allocation.
Definition 2. An allocation x: Q —* n,n=i Xi z5 sa id t° be a coarse value al-
location of the economy with differential information S if the following holds:
(i) Each net-trade x
x
— e, is A?=i ft-measurable.
9See Emmons and Scafuri (1985, p. 60) or Shafer (1980, p. 468) for further discussion.
1 The Shapley value measures is the sum of the expected marginal contributions an
agent can make to all the coalitions that he/she is a member of [see Shapley (1953)].
(ii) E?=i *i{o>) = U=i *(«), /*-*.«•
(n'ij There exist A, > 0, (i = 1, . . . ,n) with A,- Ju,(x,(cj)) dn(cj) = Sh,-(V^C ) for
all i, where Sh t-(V^C ) is the Shapley value of agent i derived from the game
(/, V\), defined in (4-1) and Sh^V/) > A t- Ju,(e t ) dfx for every i.
Condition (i) says that net-trades can only be based on common knowl-
edge of the grand coalition, (ii) is the market clearing condition, (iii) says
that the expected utility of each agent multiplied with his/her weight A t- must
be equal to his/her Shapley value derived from the TU game (/, V£) which
requires net-trades of all members of a coalition to be based on common
knowledge of the coalition. Moreover the value allocation is required to be
individually rational. Finally, note that the efficiency of the Shapley value
for games with side payments immediately implies that the value allocation
is constrained Pareto efficient.
The second concept that we introduce in this section is the fine value.
For each economy with differential information S and each set of weights
{A,: i = 1, . .
.
, n}, we associate a game with side-payments (/, V[) according
to the rule:
V{{S) = max£ A, / u t(x^)) dfi(u) (4.2)
x
'
,es
J
subject to
(i) y. x'M = Y, e«( u; )' ^ _a -e -
iGS i'€5
(ii) x
t
— e,- is V t€s .Tvmeasurable for every i 6 5.
We now give a formal definition of the fine value allocation:
Definition 3. An allocation x: Q —» Yl?=i %i is said t° be a fine value allo-
cation of the economy with differential information S if the following holds:
(i) Each net-trade x
t
— e, is V£>i 3~i -measurable,
(ii) E?=i Xi(u) = E?=i e,-(u;), l*-a-e-
(iii) There exist A, > 0, (i = 1, . .
.
, n) with A, / u,(x,(u;)) dfi(uj) = Sh,( V/) for
all i, where Sh,(V^ ) is the Shapley value of agent i derived from the game
(I,V*), defined in (4-2) and Sh,-(V/) > A, /'u,-(e t-) dp for every i.
The only difference between Definition 2 and Definition 3 is the measur-
ability assumption, i.e., net-trades are now based on pooled information of a
coalition.
We now consider existence of the coarse value allocation and the fine
value allocation in an economy with differential information. The following
Theorem, which we present here in the notation describing a game derived
from an exchange economy, is proved in Ichiishi (1983, Theorem 6.1):
Theorem 1. For every S let U(S) be the set of all utility allocations which
a coalition S can attain. Assume that U(S) fulfills the following conditions,
(i) U(S) 7^ for every coalition S
.
(ii) U(S) is compact, convex, and comprehensive. 11
(Hi) U is superadditive [i.e., let S,T be coalitions such that S fl T = then
U{S) xU(T)cU(SUT)].
Then there exists a value allocation. This allocation is Pareto optimal
and individually rational.
Clearly, for the definition of the fine and the coarse value allocation the
attainable utility allocations are given as follows:
U C (S) = {(u?i, . .
.
, wm ) £ IR
n
: there exist net-trades z,-, where J2i€S zi —
0, where z,- is A*gs .Fj-measurable, and w x < /u(e, + z,-)c//z}.
U*(S) — {{w\. . .
.
, wm ) € JR
n
: there exist net-trades zt-, where YLi^s zi =
0, where zt- is Vt'e5^r*"measiiraD ^ e ^ an<^ w* — / u ( e « + zt')^}-
Theorem 1 immediately implies that there always exists a fine value allo-
cation in our economy provided that the state space Q is finite. 12 For U C (S)
the theorem does not apply since U C (S) violates condition (iii) of Theorem 1:
Consider for example an economy with three agents denoted by /, J and K.
Assume that / and J have full information, and that agent K has only
trivial information (i.e., TK = {0,0}). Clearly U C{{K}) x U C{{LJ}) <jL
U C ({I, J, K }), and hence condition (iii) of Theorem 1 is violated.
5 Interpretation of Coarse and Fine Values
In this section we discuss the properties of the coarse and the fine value for
our economy with differential information. The straightforward explanation
of the coarse value is that it must be possible for each member of a coalition
11A subset A C Mn is comprehensive if a 6 .4 implies a' £ A for every a' < a.
12 Existence also holds for arbitrary state spaces, however, as this concept turns out to
be uninteresting we do not elaborate further on existence.
to verify the net-trades of all other members (i.e., to be able to check whether
the net-trades which are actually executed correspond to the net-trades that
agents agreed on before the agents observed their endowment realizations
and obtained additional information about the true state of nature). This
obviously becomes a problem once an agent enters a coalition who has "bad"
information (i.e., a very coarse T{). The presence of this agent and the as-
sumption that he/she must be able to verify the net-trades of all other agents
makes the whole coalition worse off. Nevertheless, one of the central ideas
underlying the concept of the value is that we wish to allocate to every agent
a consumption bundle which corresponds to his/her marginal contribution to
every coalition that he/she is a member of. The appropriateness of the con-
cept should therefore be judged according to this criterion. Thus, agents with
superior information should be assigned a higher Shapley value. In fact, for a
given differential information economy and for given utility transfer weights
this is the case. Unfortunately, the coarse value has a serious problem: It
does not exist in general unless the information asymmetry is trivial. We
show this by means of the following example (Proposition 1 in the Appendix
provides a more general result):
Example 1. Consider an economy with three agents denoted by /, J.
and K, and four states of nature a. 6, c and d. Assume that there is only
one consumption commodity in each state. The random endowment of the
agents are given by (4,4,1,1) for /; (4,1,4,1) for J; and (1,1,1,1) for K.
Agent K has an information set Tk- We consider the cases where Tk is
trivial—i.e., Tk — {{ a ,b,c,d},$}—and the case where Tk corresponds to
full information—i.e., Tk — {{ a }, {&}> { c }? {d}}- Further, assume that agent
/ cannot distinguish state a from 6, and state c from d\ and finally, agent
J cannot distinguish a from c, and 6 from d, i.e., Ti = {{a, 6}, {c,d}} and
Tj = {{a,c}, {&, d}}. Assume that all agents are described by the Neuman-
Morgenstern utility function y/x. Each state occurs with the same probabil-
ity. We now analyze the coarse value allocation for this economy.
First consider the case where K has full information. Let U C (S) de-
note the utility allocations coalition S can attain. Then U c ({i}) = {il\ <
1.5}, for i = I, J and UC{{K}) = {wK < 1}. Further, U C{{LJ}) =
{(u;/, wj): Wl < l/2\/4T7 + l/2y/T+t, and wj < l/2y/4^t + l/2y/l=t,
\t\ < 1}, since all net-trades must be state-independent. 13 On the other
13Clearly, t denotes the state independent net-transfer.
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hand, net-trades between / and K, or J and K can be state dependent.
However, they must be measurable with respect to the information of agents
I and J, respectively. Hence, U C{{I,K}) = UC ({J,K}) = {(wi ,wK ):wj <
1/2V/M=77+ l/2>/rTT7, and wK < l/2y/T=T[ + l/2yfT^h, \t{ \ < 1},
where i = /, J. Finally, in the grand coalition the only possible net-trades
are state-independent since the information sets J-j and Tj are indepen-
dent. Hence, UC{{I,J, K}) = {{wi,wj,wK):wi < l/2>/4+17+ l/2v/TTr~
for t = /, J, wk < \/l + ^a; , Y2i=i,J,KU = 0? an<i M < !}• ^ is easY to
see that all sets UC(S) are comprehensive, convex, and compact. However,
note that superadditivity (i.e., condition 3 in the Theorem) is violated since
U C({I,K}) x UC{{J}) <£ UC({I,J,K}). In fact, we show that there does not
exist a coarse value allocation. Recall that V£{S) maximizes the weighted
sum of the utility allocations in U C (S). From the definition of the Shap-
ley value, it follows immediately that Sh^ > A# f ux(eK )dfi. 14 Hence, in a
value allocation agent K must get a positive net-transfer. Since only state-
independent net-transfers are allowed in the grand coalition, either agent /
or agent J must get a lower utility than he/she derives from the initial en-
dowments. In other words, individual rationality would be violated, and a
coarse value allocation therefore does not exist.
14This can be established as follows: Given the information structure of the example
only state independent net-trades are possible between members of the grand coalition.
In order to have individual rationality, and since Yli=i j k ^n « = V>({7, «/, A"}) must hold
for every coarse value allocation, the weights A,- must be chosen such that the maximum
in (4.1) is attained when the agents get their initial endowment. This immediately implies
that it is also optimal for the coalition {/, J} to choose their initial endowment. Thus,
VAC (5) = 23,-
€
s A,- /iti(e,-)<fyi for the grand coalition, for all coalitions in which K is not
a member, and for the one-agent coalitions. However, it is also easy to see that V\(S) >
J2 t £S ^i I ui( e ») dp, for S = {/, K} and for S = {J, K). [Note that we solve
max A.-/2V4 + t\+ A t /2v/l + h + A^/Vl - *i + *K/Wl-h;
for i = /, J . It follows from the first order conditions that
iL = i±ii
i
and 4_ = i±*»
Atr 1 — *\ njf 1 — ti
Thus, t\ ^ to for all A,-, \K . Hence the assertion follows.] Hence we can conclude that
K\(5) — Va(5\ {A'}) > \k f UA'(eK-) dyt with the strict inequality holding for the coalitions
{!,!<} and {J, A'}. Hence, Sh* > XK fuK (e K )d^.
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If agent K has trivial information one can check that a coarse value
allocation exists. In this case the coarse value allocation assigns every agent
simply the initial endowment (and the A's are chosen such that no trades
takes place). The same is true for other information sets Tk which allow
only trivial net-trades. On the other hand, if Tk is sufficiently fine to allow
non-trivial net-trades within some coalitions, then a coarse value allocation
does not exist. This follows immediately from the above argument.
Example 1 shows that the coarse value allocation does not exist unless
the information structure is essentially uninteresting. In particular, a value
allocation exists only if K has trivial information, and further since the infor-
mation of / and J are independent, no non-trivial trades are possible between
agents. This non-existence example casts serious doubts on the usefulness of
the coarse value. In fact, the case against the coarse value is even more per-
suasive as our example is not pathological. Proposition 1 in the Appendix
shows that this type of example is generic. Further, existence of a coarse
value allocation is in general immediately destroyed if a player with no (or
bad) information is introduced: Note that in an economy as in Example 1,
but without agent /, a value allocation always exists. Consider the case
where K has full information. As we have shown above, a value allocation
does not exist any more if we introduce agent /. It is easy to see that the
same is true if we introduce any player with trivial information. Again, this
argument can be generalized along the lines of Proposition 1.
We next consider the fine value. Existence is not a problem for this
concept. Unfortunately, it does not measure the information advantage of an
agent in an appropriate way because the fine value allocation always coincides
with the value allocation of the corresponding complete information economy.
We show this for an example, however, this phenomenon also applies in
general as Proposition 2 in the Appendix shows.
Example 2. Consider the same differential information economy as in Ex-
ample 1. First consider the case where agent K has full information. Let
U*(S) denote the utility allocations which coalition S can attain. For one-
agent coalitions, U'(S) is the same as for the coarse value. For all other
coalitions we have immediately full information. Hence all utility vectors de-
rived from feasible allocation can be attained. Because of Theorem 1 we know
that there exists a value allocation. However, as we noted, the game corre-
12
sponds to the game with complete information, hence the value allocation
will correspond to the value allocation of the economy with full information,
and consequently docs not take into account the fact that 7 and J do not
have full information.
Next consider the case where agent K has trivial information. Here
U*({I, K}) and U*({J, K}) differ from the previous case. However, for any
weight A it follows that £/'({/, A'}) and U*({J, K}) are the same as in the
case where K has full information because it is never optimal for the coalition
consisting of i = I,J and K to make net-trades which are not measurable
with respect to T{. Hence, we get the same value allocation as in the case
where K has full information. The fine value allocation therefore ignores the
information advantages or disadvantages of agent K.
As the Examples show, neither the coarse nor the fine value give interest-
ing results. Information advantages and disadvantages are not reflected in
the fine value allocation (this is shown in general in Proposition 2 in the Ap-
pendix) and the coarse value allocation does not exist unless the information
asymmetry is uninteresting. The problem for the coarse value is of course
that we measure the negative externality an agent imposes on the coalition by
having information which is independent of other agent's information. How-
ever, the marginal contribution an agent makes to any coalition should be the
guideline for a definition of the value. This critique docs not apply to the {\\\o.
value because agents contribute to the coalition by sharing their information
with other agents. However, Example 2 shows that we can get odd results
in this case: Agents J and J can pool their information to attain complete
information and agent K is not needed— if we assume that agents report
their private information truthfully. The crucial question, of course, is will
agents report their (non-verifiable) private information truthfully? Consider
the following argument. Assume that the net-trades of agent I is given by
(0, —1.5, 1.5,0), and that the net-trade of agent J is given by (0, 1.5, —1.5,0).
The net-trade of agent K is in every state. Assume that state a is real-
ized and that I announces {a,b}. Agent J could now announce {6, c] thus
increasing his net-transfer, without I being able to tell that J misreported.
Thus, although information pooling takes place, agents might not have an
incentive to reveal their information truthfully. This makes the information
sharing assumption in the definition of the fine value somewhat problematic,
and this is also responsible for the fact that the fine value allocation does not
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take information asymmetries into account.
6 Coalitional Incentive Compatible Values
When agents have differential information, an arbitrary allocation may not
be viable since agents might have an incentive to misreport the state. In
other words, arbitrary allocations might not be incentive compatible in the
sense that groups of agents might be able to misreport their information
without other agents noticing it, and hence achieve different payoffs ex post.
Before we introduce our key incentive compatibility criterion, we introduce
the notion of a value allocation which corresponds to the core notion of
Yannelis (1991). We will show below (Lemma 2) that this value allocation
fulfills the strong incentive compatibility criterion (introduced below) and in
section 8 we show that it exists under very mild assumptions. This value
allocation concept will turn out to be quite appealing in an economy with
differential information.
For each economy with differential information S and each set of weights
{A,-: 2: = 1, . . . , n), we associate a game with side-payments (/, V\) according
to the rule: For S C I let
V\(S) = max y^ Xj / Ui(xi(uj))dfi(uj) (6-1)
Xi
ies J
subject to
(ii) X{ — e, is T{- measurable for every i.
Definition 4. An allocation x: Q —* n?=i ^i '5 said to be a coalitional incen-
tive compatible value allocation of the economy with differential information
S if the following holds:
(i) Each net-trade re,- — e, is J- {- measurable.
(H) ESri Xi(u) = E!=i Ci{uj), fi-a.e.
(Hi) There exist A,- > 0, (i = l,...,nj with A,- / u,(.T t (a;)) dfi{ijj) = Sh,(K\) for
every i, where Sh,(K\) is the Shapley value of agent i derived from the
game (/, V\), defined in (0.1) and Sh,(V\) > A,/u t (e,) d/i for every i.
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The interpretation of conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) is the same as in Defini-
tion 2. Again, note that the value allocation is constrained Pareto efficient.
We now introduce two notions of incentive compatibility.
Definition 5. A feasible allocation fulfills strong coalitional incentive com-
patibility if and only if the following does not hold:
There exists a coalition S C I and two states a and b which members of I\S
cannot distinguish (that is, a and b are in the same event of the partition for
every agent not in S) and such that after appropriate side-payments members
of S are strictly better off by announcing b whenever a has actually occurred.
Formally, strong coalitional incentive compatibility implies that there do not
exist a coalition S , states a, b with a G Ei{b) for every i fi S , and a net-trade
vector z x
,
i G S such that £«
€
s z% — and
u
l
(e
l (a) + (*•(&) - e*'(6)) + z
{
) > u
l {x l (a)), for every i G S. (CI)
Strong coalitional incentive compatibility models the idea that it is im-
possible for any subcoalition to cheat the remaining players by misreporting
the state and making side-payments to each other which agents who are
not members of this subcoalition cannot observe. If side-payments can be
observed we get the following weaker notion of incentive compatibility. (Set
Z{ — for every i G S in (Cl) to get weak coalitional incentive compatibility.)
Definition 6. A feasible allocation fulfills weak coalitional incentive com-
patibility if and only if the following does not hold:
There exists a coalition S C I and two states a and b which members of
I\S cannot distinguish and such that members of S are strictly better off by
announcing b whenever a has actually occurred. Formally, weak coalitional
incentive compatibility implies that there do not exist a coalition S and states
a, b with a G Et (b) for every i ^ S, such that
u'(e l (a) + (.t'(/;) - c l {b)) > u'Vfa)), for every i G S. (C2)
Weak incentive compatibility is weaker in the sense that allocations which
fulfill weak coalitional incentive compatibility must also fulfill strong coali-
tional incentive compatibility. It is easy to find examples where the reverse
is not true. Of course, for the case of two agents, both concepts coincide. In
what follows we will discuss both notions. It is going to turn out that in cer-
tain cases that strong coalitional incentive compatibility is analytically more
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tractable since it corresponds to individual measurability of the net-trade of
each agent. We begin our analysis with some notation.
Let UW (S) and U S (S) denote the utility allocations which coalition S can
attain, and which fulfill weak and strong coalitional incentive compatibility,
respectively. Then
UW (S) = {(wi,.
.
. ,wn ) £ Sl
n
'. there exist net-trades z,-, where Ylies z% =
0, where z t- fulfill weakly coalitional incentive compatibility, and where W{ <
/w,-(e t- + Zi)dfi}.
U S (S) = {(wi, . . • ,wn ): there exist net-trades z,-, where J2ies zi = 0? where
Z{ fulfill strong coalitional incentive compatibility, and W{ < Ju,(e t- + z,-) df.i).
Next we define the weak and strong incentive compatible value allocation:
For each economy with differential information S and for each set of weights
{A,-: i = 1, . .
.
, n} we associate a TU game (/, V™) as follows: For S C / let
V?(S) = max£A 1- /' tn(xi(u>)) dp(u>) (6.2)Xi
i€S J
subject to
(i) Y, X i(U ) = H C«'M ^"a - e -
ies ies
(ii) x t — e, fulfills weak coalitional incentive compatibility
Definition 7. An allocation x:Cl —* ["["= i Xi *5 said 1° be a weak coali-
tional incentive compatible value allocation of the economy with differential
information S if the following holds:
(i) The allocation X{ fulfills weak coalitional incentive compatibility,
(ii) E?=i z.'M = £?=i e,-(u;), fi-a.e.
(Hi) There exist A, > 0, (i = I, . . . ,n) with A, /u t-(x,-(u;)) dfj,(u>) = Sh,-(Vx") for
alii, where Sh^V^) is the Shapley value of agent i derived from the game
(/, V™), defined in (6.2) and Shi(V™) > A, /u,-(e,-)^ for every i.
To define the strong incentive compatible value allocation replace condi-
tion (ii) in (6.2) condition (i) in Definition 7 by: The allocation x, fulfills
strong coalitional incentive compatibility.
We now continue by characterizing the sets U S (S) and UW (S). It will
turn out that U S (S) corresponds to the attainable utility allocations which
fulfill individual measurability of the net-trade of each agent for an economy
with one commodity per state.
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Let U(S) = {{wi, . . . ,wn ): there exist net-trades z\ such that Y^ies zi = 0\
where Z{ is ^-measurable , and w x < Ju,(e, + Z{)dfi}.
Lemma 1. The sets U(S), UW (S) andUs(S) arc comprehensive. If the state
space Cl is finite then U(S), U r"(S) and U*(S) are also compact.
Proof. In botli cases compactness follows immediately from the continuity
of U{. It remains to prove that the sets arc comprehensive. This follows,
however, immediately form the definition of U
,
Uw and U s .
Lemma 2. The following relation holds: U(S) C U S (S) C UW (S) for every
coalition S C I . Moreover, if there is only one commodity per state then the
first inclusion holds with equality, i.e., U(S) = U S (S).
Proof. It is obvious that U S (S) C U W (S). We now show that U(S) C U S {S).
Let w 6 U{S). Then there exist net-trades Z{ such that z,- is JF--measurable
for every agent x, and J2ies zi — 0> and ty t- < /ut'(ct + Zi)dp. For every
subcoalition T C S let z r = YlieT z i- Since the feasibility constraint holds
with equality it follows that zs^ = —zT . Since z^ 1 is VtrfS ^i-measurable
it follows therefore that z s is also V 1€S"^r«"measura'3 'e - Hence, members of T
cannot gain from misreporting their private information. Tliis proves strong
incentive compatibility.
Finally we show the equality for the case of an economy with one com-
modity per state. Since we have already proved that U(S) C U S (S) for every
S it remains to prove that U S (S) C U{S) for every ,9. Suppose by way of con-
tradiction that the net-trade of one agent, say agent j is not ^".-measurable.
Hence, there exist two states a and b which agent j cannot distinguish and for
which z3 (a) ^ ~ J (b). Without loss of generality assume that z 3 (a) > z J (b).
Then in state b the coalition T = S\ {j} can announce state a without agent
j being able to notice it. Thus, they can redistribute their excess income and
make all members of T better off. This provides the contradiction to strong
incentive compatibility. Hence U S (S) C U(S). This concludes the proof.
Lemma 2 implies that when there is one commodity per state of nature the
sets U S (S) and U(S) coincide for every S. Therefore existence of an incentive
compatible value allocation for S implies the existence of a strong incentive
compatible value allocation in such a case. However, even when there is
one commodity per state the presence of an arbitrary state space makes the
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consumption space infinite dimensional and therefore the proof of a strong
incentive compatible value allocation is non-trivial (this is done in section 8).
For a finite state space H, the existence of an incentive compatible value
allocation and hence of a strong incentive compatible value allocation follows
from Theorem 1. Unfortunately, for weak coalitional incentive compatibility,
convexity can be violated, and hence the proof does not go through. In
some cases we can therefore get non-existence of weak coalitional incentive
compatible value allocations.
7 Interpretation of Weak, Strong, and Coa-
litional Incentive Compatible Values
In this section we continue with the economy of Example 1 and derive the
games for the strong, the weak and the coalitional incentive compatible value
allocation.
Example 3. Consider the same economy as in Example 1. We now analyze
the strong incentive compatible value allocation, i.e., the value allocation of
the game (7, V\{S)) and the coalitional incentive compatible value allocation,
i.e., the value allocation of the game (/, V\{S)). By Lemma 2 both are the
same. As in the previous examples we work with the set of attainable utility
allocations U(S) = U*{S).
The payoffs to the one-agent coalitions are the same as in the previous
cases. Further, U({I, J}) = U C ({I, J}), because Ti and Tj are independent.
This, however, does not apply to the other two agent coalitions. U({ /, A'}) =
U{{J K}) = {(xuu w2):w i < l/2v/TTT7-l- L/2VTT5, w2 < 1 /'2y/F=T +
1/2-y/l — t 2 , such that |/,-| < 1, for i = 1,2}. Similarly, wc derive that
£/({/, J, A'}) = {(iui,w-2,iuz): there exist state independent net-trades z,-,
i = I, J, K where 2, is ^-measurable for i = ./, A', where Yli=i jk z i — 0)
and iUi < Y23=a ,b,c,d l/'l\A'i + ~n f° l * '• — fiJiK}- Because of Theorem 1 (or
Theorem 2 of Section 8) there exists a coalitional incentive compatible value
allocation. Further, it is obvious that VX{{I,J,K}) > VX ({I,J}) + V\({K})
for all A > 0. 15 Hence, Sh/
v
'(V\) > J"A'(e/v-) d/i, i.e., agent K must get a
higher utility than he/she derives from the initial endowment.
15 Note that V\({I,J}) + V\({I\}) is less or equal to the payoff of the grand coalition if
agents are restricted to state-independent net-trades. Optimal risk sharing when agent i's
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Now consider the case where Tk ' s trivial. In such a case only constant
net-trades are possible and the value allocation assigns to every agent his/her
initial endowment.
In contrast to the previous examples, the information of agent K now
matters. If agent K has full information then he/she can use this information
advantage to act as an intermediary to allow trade between agent / and
agent J. This becomes clear when looking at V\({I, J, K, }) and V\({I,J}).
Without agent A', agents I and J cannot do any risk sharing. This changes
when agent K enters the coalition. Now all trades basically go via agent K
since V\({I t J, K, }) is essentially the union of V\({I, A'}) and V\({J, A'}).
In addition, the agent is compensated for his/her intermediation service by
getting a strictly higher utility than in the case where he/she is less well
informed. However, it is essential for agent K to have a strictly positive
endowment in every state. If agent A''s endowment is for example 0, then
he/she is not able to insure agent / and J, i.e., to increase their consumption
in the low-income state and increase it in the high-income state since this
would require agent K to hold a positive initial endowment in state d. Thus,
the coalitional incentive compatible value allocation in such a case would
assign to every agent the initial endowment. This changes immediately if we
consider endowments which are not independent.
Example 3a. Consider an economy as in Example 3 but assume that the
endowments of agent / and J are given by (4,4,1,4) and (4,1,4,4), respec-
tively. Assume that T\ — {{«, b, d], {c}}, Tj = {{a, c, d], {b}}, and that
agent K has full information. We also assume that agent K has zero endow-
ment in all states. Since the derivation of V\(S) is the same as in Example 3
we just sketch the argument that Sh/V-(V\) > for every A > 0, and for every
A possible in the value allocation (even if A/
x
- = 0).
Consider the grand coalition. Let £, be the net-trade of agent i = I,J
in the low-income, and let L\ denote the net-trade of agent i = I,J in the
high-income state. If A if > then the first order conditions immediately
net-trade must be ^--measurable, implies that agent /v's consumption in state d must be
strictly lower than his/her consumption in state a. Hence, such an allocation cannot be
achieved via state-independent net-transfers, and the inequality follows.
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imply that it is never optimal to choose t{ = t\ for i = /, J. lG If A/v- =
then the first order conditions imply that it is never optimal to choose i{ — i\
for i = I, J unless Z, = t[ ^ 0. 17 However, this implies that one of the
agents must get a negative net-transfer in all states, and hence individual
rationality must be violated, 18 and the associated weights A cannot occur as
transfer weights in a value allocation. Thus, K\({7, J, A'}) — V\{{] , J}) >
for all possible weights A, since the coalition {I, J) is restricted to state-
indepeno|ent net-transfers. Therefore Agent K has a positive Shapley value,
and he/she must get a positive consumption in the value allocation. Note,
that any notion of a Walrasian equilibrium in this economy will give zero
consumption to agent K since his/her budget set is always zero.
The reason why the value allocation assigns positive consumption to
agent K if the endowments of agents / and J arc not independent, whereas
his/her consumption must be zero if the endowments are independent, has
the following interpretation: In both cases agents / and J attempt to insure
against low-income realizations. Because of differential information, how-
ever, they need agent K as an intermediary to execute the correct trades.
1GThe agents solve
3A, i . , ,. . A, . \k I ~ ~ . A/v-
1
i= J,J
Without loss of generality assume that A/ > 0. Then the first order conditions are
3A/ 2A/V' A/v'
\/4 + I', sj-t', - l'j sj-i'j-tj
A; \ K
\AT77 sj-h - l'j
"
Clearly, there does not exist a solution if i't = t[ and if l'j = tj.
17The argument is similar as ahovc. Just consider the first order conditions of
3A/ I ~ A; . 3Ai
,
\j I
t t ,t't
4 V ' 4 4 4 V '
and choose tj = t'j = 0.
18Since J2i=I,J,K Shi(Vx) = V\{{UJ<}), we conclude that A,- / «/(*,•) dfi = Sh,(KA ),
where X{ is tho consumption of agent t after the transfers /, anil t\. Hence the assertion
follows.
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This arrangement works even if agent K has zero-endowment as long as only
one of the agents has a low endowment realization, because the claim of
this particular agent can then he covered by the agent who has the high
endowment-realization. This is basically the setting of Example 3a. If both
agents have low endowment realizations at the same time (which can occur
if endowments are independent) then they both want a positive net-transfer.
Agent K Gannot fulfill his/her payment obligations because his/her endow-
ment is zero, and K would have to default. The problem is therefore to
find an incentive compatible way of letting agent K announce default in
such a case. Clearly this is possible if agent / and agent J are able to ob-
serve state d} 9 Another possibility is to weaken the incentive compatibility
requirements. We do this in the following example.
Example 4. Consider the economy of Example 1, except assume that agent
ICs endowment is given by (0,0,0,0) but the agent has full information. We
now analyze the weak coalitional incentive compatible value.
It is clear that the U S {S) = UW {S) for the coalitions S = {/}, S = {J}
and S = {I, J). Further, for the coalitions S = {/, A'} and S = {./, A'}
we can derive U X"(S) by a similar procedure as U S (S), taking into account
that agent K has zero endowment. The attainable utility allocations dif-
fer in an interesting way when we consider the grand coalition. We show
that UW ({I, J, A'}) corresponds to the attainable utility allocations under
full information:
Consider an allocation (x[,xj,xk) which is Pareto optimal under full
information. Let Xi(s) denote the consumption of agent i in state s. We now
show that this allocations fulfills weak coalitional incentive compatibility.
Clearly, X{(b) = X{(c) for i = /,J, A', since the aggregate endowment in
states a and 6 coincides. Further, x h-(a) > Xj{(b) > xh-(d). Note that
agent K cannot misreport if state d occurs because one of the other agents
will disagree. 20 The same is true if state b or state c occurs. Finally, agent K
19This can be done simply by assuming in Example 3 that the information partitions
of agents / and J are given by {{a,b}, {c}, {d} } and {{a,c}, {&}, {</}}, respectively. The
proof that agent A''s Shapley value (and hence consumption) is strictly positive is along
the same lines as Example 3a.
20Agent K can only announce either states b or c. Hence either agent 1 or J must agree.
This, however, is impossible since they would have to pay a net-transfer corresponding to
a high income state which is always strictly higher than the net-transfer in a low income
state.
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has no incentive to misreport in state a since this is the state where he/she
gets the highest net- transfer.
Next note that the sets £/ 1u (.S) fulfill the conditions of Theorem 1. Hence
there exists a value allocation. We now show that agent K must get a
strictly positive consumption of the good in each state of nature in the value
allocation. This, however, follows immediately since the above computation
imply that VAW ({7, J, A'}) - V?{{I, J}) > for every A and hence Sh*(V5") >
0.
21 Since Sh/^(VA") = A*.. / uk(x^) d(i, where xj< is the consumption assigned
to agent K in the value allocation, XfK- must be strictly positive.
In contrast to the fine and the coarse value allocation, the weak, the
strong, and the coalitional incentive compatible value allocation give very
plausible and interesting results for our differential information economy and
information superiority of an agent is now taken into account explicitly. Ex-
ample 3 shows that the information of agent K matters (and the same is
true for all other agents). In particular, if agent K. has complete informa-
tion, he/she can act as an intermediary between agent / and agent J. In
the case of the strong and the coalitional incentive compatible value agent
K uses his/her own endowment to insure the other agents and all trades go
via agent K . Furthermore, as Examples 3a and 4 show, agent K can still
be an "intermediary" between agent / and agent J even without having a
positive endowment: Agent K simply announces the true state of nature and
as compensation for this service gets a positive net-transfer.
This role of agent K in Examples 3a and 4 is interesting in connec-
tion with the literature on financial intermediation. For example, Boyd and
Prescott (1986) argue that coalitional structures, i.e., cooperative games with
differential information, are important for understanding financial interme-
diation. They use an economy with differential information, however, they
assume that there exists an "evaluation technology" to verify the true state of
the economy—using this technology is costly. 22 In their analysis they propose
the core as a solution concept. As our examples indicate, the Shapley value
is an interesting tool for the analysis of problems of financial intermediation
The inequality follows since the grand coalition can attain all unconstrained Pareto
efficient allocations. None of them can be attained via state-independent net-transfers.
22Boyd and Prescott (198G, p. 212) note that their evaluation technology is endogenous
in the sense that it depends on the state of the economy. Nevertheless, the specific structure
of the cost function as assumed at the outset.
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and might work better than the core for the following reasons.
First, incentive compatible value allocations obviate the need to assume
the existence of a state verification technology at the outset. Rather, verifi-
cation evolves endogenously in our model. Whenever there is "doubt" about
the state of the economy, agent / and agent J can turn to agent K who then
announces the true state. Further, agent K is compensated for this service
by a positive net-transfer. This net-transfer to agent K can be interpreted as
a "cost of state verification" paid by agent / and agent J, and the magnitude
of this cost is determined endogenously. Thus, our results in Examples 3, 3a,
and 4 provide insight into models with costly state verification introduced by
Townsend (1979). Instead of exogenously assuming the existence of a costly
state verification technology (as is standard in this literature), one can as-
sume as in our example that there is one (or more) additional agent(s) with
zero endowment and "better" (or complete) information. The weak and the
coalitional incentive compatible value allocation assigns positive consump-
tion to this agent for announcing the true state of nature, and this transfer
is interpreted as the cost of state verification paid by the other agents.
The second reason that we believe that the incentive compatible value
may be preferable to the core for intermediation problems is demonstrated
by the following example.
Example 5. Consider an economy with four agents denoted by /, J, Ku
K-i- Assume that the endowment, distribution, and information structure
for / and J is the same as in example 3a. Furthermore, assume that K\
and A'2 both have full information and zero endowments (so there are now
two intermediaries instead of one). We wish to show that the value allo-
cation in this example is more plausible than either the Wilson-type cores
[Wilson (1978)], or the Yannelis-typc core [Yannelis (1991)], or even the
Walrasian equilibrium (i.e., any rational expectation equilibrium concept).
In any core allocation, agents K\ and K2 both get zero. This follows imme-
diately from the following argument: Assume by way of contradiction that
K\ has positive consumption in a core allocation. Then the coalition con-
sisting of /, J and K2 can block this allocation denoted by (x[,xj,xk^,xk2 ).
For example, choose (xj + ex h] ,xj + £#/<:,, 0, xr2 + (1 - 2e)xh- i ) for t > 0.
Moreover, since the budget sets of agents A'i and A'2 contain only the zero
consumption vector, any rational expectations equilibrium concept will give
zero to both agents.
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In contrast, the value allocation still assigns a positive consumption to K{,
2 = 1,2. This follows immediately from the argument we used in Example 3a.
For all possible transfer-weights A we still get V\{{I, J, A',}) — V\({I, J}) > 0,
i — 1,2. Hence, Sh/V-,(V\) > for i = 1,2. Since Sh/v-( V\) = A* j' u^(x^) dfi,
Ki and K2 must get a positive level of consumption.
In Example 5 the Shapley value still assigns positive net-payments to the
intermediaries—even when there is more than one intermediary. This is the
case since each of the intermediaries makes a "contribution to society" due
to his/her superior information. In this example the core and the Walrasian
equilibrium seem to be less plausible. If the intermediaries get zero payofF
for their service, the question is of course why they should serve as interme-
diaries. The reader should also note that a similar result can be derived for
the weak coalitional incentive compatible value allocation in a setting as in
Example 3.
Note that Examples 3a, 4, and 5 resemble the phenomena first observed by
Roth (1980) and Shafer (1980) for the ordinal and cardinal value allocation
for an economy without differential information, i.e., an agent with zero
initial endowment may end up with a positive consumption of each good in
the economy. This was shown to be true for some choice of weights. Of
course, in their examples there also exists a value allocation which assigns
zero consumption to the agents with zero endowment [sec also the subsequent
discussion in Aumann (1985, 1987), Roth (1983), Scafuri and Yannelis (1984),
and Yannelis (1983)]. Despite the fact that our Example 5 has the same flavor
as that of the Roth-Shafer examples, the differential economy framework
seems to provide now a nice interpretation of the agent with no endowment,
i.e., this agent can be viewed as a financial intermediary. 23 It is also important
to note that now the intermediary (despite the fact that he/she has zero initial
endowment) ends up with positive consumption of each good in the economy
for any choice of the weights in contrast to the Roth-Shafer examples.
23The financial intermediary interpretation in the lloth-Sliafer examples is more subtle,
but it works in a similar way: Due to the fact that the agent has a "better" utility function
(is less risk averse) he/she can make a positive contribution to all two agent coalitions.
This contribution may be viewed as facilitating risk sharing.
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8 Existence of Coalitional Incentive Com-
patible Value Allocations
The goal of this section is to provide a general existence result. In particular
we show that coalitional incentive compatible value allocations exist in a
setting where there is an infinite number of commodities and an infinite
number of states of nature. Before stating our existence result, we outline
some mathematical preliminaries. For the reader who is only interested in
an existence result for finite dimensional commodity spaces, all he/she has
to know is that order intervals are weakly compact in L ln»(f.i) (which follows
from Cartwright's Theorem stated below).
8.1 Mathematical Preliminaries
Let (0,^", /z) be a probability space, and X be a Banach space. For 1 <
p < oo, we denote by Lx (f.i) the space of all equivalence classes of X-valued
Bochner integrable functions /: T —* X normed by
ri,. = (/wor -wo)'-
It is a standard result that when normed by the functional j • J above, L
p
x (fi)
becomes a Banach space [sec Dicstel and Uhl (1977), p. 50]. Recall that a
correspondence (f>:T —* 2X is said to be intcgrably bounded if there exists a
map h
€
L}n such that sup{|;rfl: x (E 0(0} ^ M0> f L ' il - (-
A Banach space has the Radon-Nikodym Properly with respect to the
measure space (T, /?, ft) if for each /^-continuous A'- valued measure on T with
bounded variation G there exists a y G Lx such that G(A) = fA g(t) dfi(t)
for all A 6 (S. A Banach space X has the Radon-Nikodym Property (RNP)
if X has the RNP with respect to every finite measure space. Recall now
[see Diestel-Uhl (1977, Theorem 1, p. 98)] that if (T,(3,fi) is a finite measure
space 1 < p < oo, and X is a Banach space, then X* has the RNP if and
only if {Lpx )
m
= L\. where * +
J
= 1.
We close this section by collecting some basic results on Banach lattices
[for an excellent treatment sec Aliprantis and Burkinshaw (1985)]. Recall
that a Banach space X is a Banach lattice if there exists an ordering > on
X with the following properties:
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(i) x > y implies x + z > y -f z for every z G X;
(ii) x > y implies Ax > Ay for every scalar A > 0;
(iii) for all x,y G X there exists a supremum (denoted by x V y) and an
infimum (denoted by x A y).
(iv) |x| > \y\ implies [a: I > \\y\\ for all x,y G X.
As usual, x+ = X V 0, a?
-
= ( — 2) V 0, and |x| = x+ + x~, we call x+
and x~ the positive and negative parts of x, respectively and |x| the absolute
value of x. For x, ?/ G X we define the order interval [x,y] as follows:
[x,y] = {z eX:x <z < y}.
Note that [x,?/] is convex and norm closed, hence weakly closed (recall
Mazur's Theorem). A Banach lattice L is said to have an order continu-
ous norm if xn J, in L implies |xn J J. 0. A very useful result which will
play an important role is that if X is a Banach lattice then the fact that X
has an order continuous norm is equivalent to the weak compactness of order
intervals [see for example Aliprantis and Burkinshaw (1985)].
We finally note that Cartwright (1974) has shown that if X is a Banach
lattice with order continuous norm (or equivalently X has weakly compact
order intervals) then L\{f.i) has weakly compact order intervals, as well.
Cartwright's Theorem will play a crucial role in our existence proof.
8.2 The Existence Proof
Let the commodity space Y be the positive cone of a separable Banach lattice
Z. Assume that Z has an order continuous norm, and that its dual Z* has
the Radon- Nikodym Property. We now state our main existence result.
Theorem 2. Let S — {(X,-,u,-,e,-,^i,/i): i = l....,n} be a finite exchange
economy with differential information (as described in Section 3), satisfying
the following assumptions for each agent:
(Al) Xi'.Q, —* 2 is a convex, closed, non-empty valued correspondence.
(A2) U{\ Y — IR is weakly continuous, integrably bounded and concave.
(A3) e,:fi —* Y is integrably bounded.
Then a coalitional incentive compatible value allocation exists in S
.
Proof. Let {(X,-,t/,-, e,): i = 1,2,. . . ,11} be an exchange economy where
(a) X{ C HI 1 is the consumption set of agent i\
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(b) U{\ X{ —* M is the utility function of agent i;
(c) e t- G A",- is the initial endowment of agent i.
Given an economy {(Xt-,Ui,et ):2 = 1,2, ...,n} and a set of weights {A,:
i = 1, . .
.
, n}, where A,- > for every i and £JLj A, = 1, define the game
Va(5) = max ^T AtUj(a; t ), subject to ^ a:,- = y^e t-.
Denote by Sh,-(V\) the Shapley value of agent i. The allocation
n
x = (xu ... ,a?„) G fJXj
t=i
is said to be a X-transfer value allocation or a cardinal value allocation for
the economy {(X,-,iz,-, et-):i = l,...,n} if
(i) £?=i *i = Si * and
(ii) there exist {A,- > 0: z = 1, . .
.
,n} with ££=i ^i = 1 sucn tnat ^tui(s«) =
Sh t (Vx), and Sh t (K\) > A,u t (e,) for each i.
Emmons and Scafuri (1985) or Shapley (1969) show that if u x is concave,
and continuous; and if X{ is bounded from below, closed and convex; then a
cardinal value allocation exists for the economy {(X,-,Wi,e,-):, 2 = 1,...
,
n}.
Let Lxi denote the set of all functions x,-:ft —+ Y which are ^-measurable,
and for which x,(o;) G Xi(u), ^-a.e. Define W^.Lx, — Si by W^x) =
fui(xi(Lj))dfi(u).
We will prove our Theorem by considering its trace in finite dimensions
and appealing to the Emmons and Scafuri (1985) existence result. We first
need to prove some simple facts:
(1) Lx, is non-empty.
(2) Lx, is convex, closed and bounded from below.
(3) W{ is weakly continuous on Lx,-
(4) W{ is concave on Lx, .
Fact (1) follows immediately. Since by assumption e, is ^--measurable and
integrably bounded, we can conclude that e, G Lx,- Fact (2) follows directly
from assumption (A.l). Fact (3) is proved in Yannelis (1991, Claim 4.1) and
(4) follows directly from the concavity of i/,.
Now consider the economy S — {(Lx,,^,^,):? = l,...,n}, where Lx,
denotes the consumption set of agent i, where W{ is the utility function of
agent i, and where e, G Lx, denotes the initial endowment of agent i. Note
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that the existence of a value allocation in £ implies the existence of a value
allocation for the original economy £.
Let A be the set of all finite dimensional subspaces of Ly>(fi) containing
the initial endowments. For each a £ A, let Lx = Lx, PI at be the consump-
tion set of agent i and Wf: L Xi —* M be the utility function of agent i. For
each a 6 A, we have an economy £a with a finite dimensional consumption
space. Further, for each a £ A, the economy £a fulfills the assumptions of
Emmons and Scafuri (1985). Hence there exists a value allocation, i.e., there
exist xa G n?=i Lx . such that
0) E?=1 *f = E?=i\-;
(ii) there exist A? > with E"=1 K = 1, such that A? W?(xf ) = Sh,-(VW<0
for every z, where Sh,-(K\WQ ) is the Shapley value of agent i derived from
the game (I,VXw°)?4 and Sh,(VW<«) > A t^(e1 ).
By (i) we have that
o < i!>? = i>. = <=
i=i i=i
Hence each xf lies in the order interval [0, e] in Ya=\ ^x, C Ly(fi), which
is weakly compact by Cartwright's Theorem [see Cartwright (1974) or Sec-
tion 8.1].
Order the set A by inclusion. Then {(#-?,. ..,#", A",. .
.
, A"): a E A]
is a net in K = n?=i[0> e ] x A, where A denotes the (n — l)-dimensional
simplex. Since K is compact there exists a subnet which converges to a
point (xi, . .
.
, xn , Aj, . . . , An ). To complete the proof we must show that this
limit is a value allocation of our original economy £, i.e., that conditions (i)
and (ii) hold, (i) follows immediately, (ii) follows from the weak continuity
of W{ and from the continuity of the Shapley value in A. This concludes the
proof.
Corollary 1. Let £ = {(A';,u
t ,
e,-, J-{, ft): i = l....,n} be a finite exchange
economy with differential information, satisfying the assumptions of the main
^Clearly, the game (/, V\w) is defined as follows: For every coalition S C /let
VXw(S) = max Y] XfWfixi) subject to Y^ = ]Pe*.
x
i »6.S' i£.V iG-S'
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theorem. Suppose there is one commodity per state. Then there exists a strong
coalitional incentive compatible value allocation in E.
Proof. Combine Theorem 2 with Lemma 2.
9 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we studied the cardinal value allocation in an economy with
differential information. We showed that whenever coalitions of agents either
pool their private information (fine value allocation) or whenever coalitions of
agents base their decision on common knowledge (coarse value allocation) the
information advantage or superiority of an agent is not reflected in the above
concepts in any interesting way. Moreover, for the fine value allocation there
is not necessarily truthful revelation of information within a coalition, and
the coarse value allocation does not exist in general. However, the coalitional
incentive compatible value allocation seems to provide not only an interesting
way to measure the "worth" of the information advantage of an agent (a
property not necessarily shared by the Walrasian equilibrium or the core in
a differential information economy framework) but also ensures the truthful
revelation of information within a coalition, because incentive compatibility is
now inherent in this concept. We also indicated (Examples 3a, 4 and 5) that
the coalitional incentive compatible value allocation provides more plausible
outcomes than the Walrasian equilibrium and the core. Furthermore, our
examples suggests that the value allocation may be suitable for analyzing
problems of financial intermediation. Finally, we note that the coalitional
incentive compatible value allocation exists under very mild assumptions
and it provides plausible outcomes in situations where the more traditional
concepts fail to do so. We believe that this concept has great potential
in applications to a broad class of problems in economies with differential
information.
After obtaining the main results of our paper, we became aware of inde-
pendent work by Beth Allen (1991a) which examines some of the concepts
that we analyze in this paper in a game theoretic setting. It is important
to note that our results are not coincident with hers. Rather, they comple-
ment each other. In particular, we concentrate on the interpretation of the
different value allocation concepts, and on the problem of truthful revela-
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tion of information within each coalition, whereas Allen's main focus is to
provide existence theorems for TU and NTU games, with additional infor-
mation sharing rules other than those examined in our paper. Moreover, it
is important to note that the techniques used in either paper are different.
10 Appendix
The purpose of this section is to establish that the examples which we use
are not "pathological. " Instead, the central ideas which we show via these
examples hold in much more general environments. We start by showing
that the non-existence result of Example 1 is generic for a broader class of
differential information economies. 25 For simplicity we consider economies
with three agents /, J and K where t\i=i,j,K ?i * s trivial and with only one
commodity per state. However, it is straightforward to extend this argument
to more general classes of economies.
Proposition 1. Assume that there are three agents such that A t=/,j,A" ^i Z5
trivial and such that T{ A Tj is non-trivial for some i ^ j. Further, assume
that there is one commodity per state and at least three states of nature. Then
a coarse value allocation does not exist generically.
Proof. Denote by W
x
the expected utility of agent i. Since by definition the
value allocation must be individually rational, the weights A, must be chosen
such that (e/,ej,eA') maximizes
y^ A,-Wt (e t- 4- £,), subject to jTj t t = 0,
i=I,J,K i=I,J,K
where the t{ are state independent net-transfers. Normalize the A, by choos-
ing A^- = 1. Then it follows that
v
_
T.u,&idWKldxu {tK )
25
"Generic" means that if we fix the information structure of an economy and perturb
the endowments of the agents such that the endowment of every agent remains measurable
with respect to his/her information then non-existence of a coarse value allocation holds
for an open set of economies whose complement has measure zero.
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Further, in a value allocation Sh,- = A,Wi(e,) for every agent i. Thus, we
have more than two equations which must be fulfilled for the A,. Hence, if
we can show that the derivative of (Al) and of the functions Sh, — A,iy,(et )
has a rank of at least three, a solution cannot exist for a generic choice of
initial endowments.
Clearly, by taking the derivative of A,- with respect to e,- we get a matrix of
full rank. It is therefore sufficient to show that there exists a vector h G iR3 'Q '
such that the derivative of A,- and u,- in the direction h is zero and such that
the derivative of Sh,- in the direction of h is non-zero. This can be achieved
as follows. Assume without loss of generality that Ti A Tj is non-trivial.
Hence there exists a partition of Cl into two sets T\ and T2 such that agent
/ and J can attain arbitrary income transfers which are constant on T\ and
T2. It is easy to see that maximizing the weighted sum of utilities of agent /
and J requires
J2 dWj/dxUxi) = £ dWj/dxu(xj), for i = 1,2. (.42)
The fact that a derivative in the direction h should not change the utility
and the weights of agents / and J can be expressed by four equations which
h must fulfill. Since h is an element of at least a six-dimensional Euclidean
space we have sufficient freedom to choose «/i such that the derivatives of
the left- and right hand-side of (A2) in the direction h differ. This however
means that the derivative of Sh/ or Shj in the direction h is non-zero. This
concludes the proof.
Next we establish in general that the fine value allocation does not take
information asymmetries into account.
Proposition 2. Let S be an economy with differential information, and
let S be the corresponding full information economy (i.e, the economy where
Ti — T for all agents i). Then all fine value allocations of the two economies
coincide.
Proof. The essential idea is already contained in Example 2. Let T{ de-
note the cr-algebra generated by e,. Concavity of the utility functions of all
agents implies that in the full information case, agents in a coalition S will
never choose net-trades which are not measurable with respect to Vt'e5-^»'-
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Since T{ C Fi it follows that all such allocations can be also achieved in the
economy with differential information. Hence Vy(S) will be the same in the
full information and in the differential information case. All value allocations
must therefore coincide.
The other examples also immediately generalize to more general cases.
For example, we can choose in Example 4, n agents with independent endow-
ments and whose information is the cr-algebra generated by the endowment,
and an additional agent who has "better information" (though not necessar-
ily complete information). Then a weakly coalitional incentive compatible
value allocation will exist, and the agent with the better information will
serve as an intermediary again receiving a positive net-payment for his/her
service.
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